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NUMBER 1

The impending possibility of commercial development of the vast
concentrations of oil shale has added a new dimension to the expanding
field of natural resources. To provide the legal profession with a source
of scholarly materials on the law of the development and conservation
of these natural resources, the LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW presents two articles reflecting different viewpoints relating to the development of public domain oil shale land. The first article is a presentation
of the separate views of John Kenneth Galbraith as a member of the
Oil Shale Advisory Board to the Secretary of the Interior. In discussing
the development of oil shale in view of alternative existing energy
supplies, the public interest and wise conservation practice, Professor
Galbraith refutes the charge that government is delaying development
of the resource and suggests a businesslike approach to the oil shale
problem.

SEPARATE VIEWS OF
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH-INTERIM REPORT OF THE
OIL SHALE ADVISORY BOARD*
TirE CONTROLLING FACTS

T

HIS report is right in stressing that the oil shale deposits,
underlying some 5,118,000 acres in Colorado, Utah and
Wyoming, are a publicly owned resource of great magnitude.
Several hundred years' supply of petroleum at present consumption rates exist in these beds on lands owned by the
people of the United States. Foresighted efforts in the past
have kept these lands from those who, under the sanction of
private enterprise, view public property only as an opportunity for personal profit. Having withstood thoughtfully
designed raids in the past, it is important that the government
show equal wisdom and restraint in the present on behalf
of our resources for the future.
(2) The American people are not presently aware of
the wealth they own in these deposits. It is important both
for the conservation and wise and equitable development of
* This article is a reprint from the Interim Report of the Oil Shale Advisory
Board to the Secretary of the Interior of the separate views of John Kenneth
Galbraith as a member of the Board.
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these resources that there be the widest public knowledge of
this endowment and the issues concerning their exploitation.
An informed public will be a major source of strength to
officials seeking sound conservation policies. We urge that
all conservation-minded members of the Congress and the
public inform themselves fully on this vast resource and
policies concerning its use.
(3) The amount of oil underlying any given area varies
greatly. But the enormous concentration under the richer
areas, as noted in the report, must be stressed. In the richest
parts of the Piceance Basin some sections of 640 acres are
estimated to contain 21/2 billion barrels of oil. Current total
consumption of oil in the United States is about three billion
barrels annually.
(4) While some eighty-five per cent of the shale measured in barrels is in public ownership, the remainder is in
private hands. Much of this is owned or controlled by the
larger oil companies. Present known private oil company
holdings of 168,000 acres contain an estimated 31 billion
barrels, the equivalent of ten years' current total consumption
for the United States.
(5) As noted in the report, while high quality oil has
been produced in small quantity from oil shale, an economical process of recovery has yet to be perfected. While it
seems likely that such a method can be developed, the costs
of such development are unknown. Hence the eventual costs
of production of shale oil are unknown.
(6) There is no showing of urgent economic or strategic
need for oil from the shale in the present or near future. The
domestic petroleum industry is operating under severe government restriction. Imports are subject to quota. These
sources are almost certainly cheaper than oil from shale by
prospective processes. Hence there is no pressing peacetime
need for oil from shale. Given the most rapid development,
the share of oil from shale in total production will be negligible for many years. Hence it will not, in the foreseeable
future, be an important wartime resource replacing any
important present source of petroleum. We cite this because
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/2
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strategic arguments are regularly advanced for oil shale
development. They appear to reflect only the common effort
to find a national security justification for action that individuals or groups would find in their economic interest.
(7) There is strong pressure to develop an oil shale
i.ndustry in the states involved for the beneficial effect on
local incomes, employment and property values.
(8) The major oil companies are naturally concerned
with protecting their position in the event of the development
of an oil shale industry by buying or controlling oil shale
acreage. However with one or two exceptions they seem
not now inclined to incur substantial development costs to
produce shale oil. Certainly for companies with alternative
sources of petroleum, the economic attraction of oil shale is
not high. The incentive to control oil-bearing acreage is thus,
for the time being, much greater than the incentive to produce from it. This incentive, however, is very strong and
strongly indicated by present efforts to obtain acreage in the
area. The Shell Oil Company has proposed that it be granted
leases of 50,000 acres of the oil shale lands in the central
area of the Piceance Basin. These are estimated to contain
150 billion barrels of oil. This would suffice to cover all of
the Shell's oil requirements at the present rate of refining
for an estimated 660 years. It is the equivalent of roughly
five times the total of all proved petroleum resources in the
United States. Sinclair has made requests that would suffice
that company on the same basis for an estimated 226 years.
Modest requests from Humble and Continental for approximately 5,000 acres would cover the total present production
of each company for 54 and 27 years respectively. We believe
that much of the current interest in leasing is related not
to a desire for development but to a desire to control land.
We stress again the richness of seemingly small areas well
below what many might characterize as a "commercial scale"
lease. The Department of the Interior estimates that some
1,000 acre tracts in the heart of the basin contain as much
as 3 billion barrels of oil, the equivalent of a year's consumption at current rates for the United States as a whole. As
noted, 5,120 acre tracts in this area contain as much as 18
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967
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billion barrels of oil, the equivalent of 55 per cent of the
nation's total proved reserves of petroleum.
(9) Part of the oil shale lands belong to a Naval oil
reserve. This and the very large quantities of oil in small
acreages, and subject to requests such as the above, would
seem certain to stimulate recollections of past experience
with Teapot Dome and Elk Hills. This suggests that public
policy toward these lands should be even more than normally
circumspect.
CONCLUSIONS

(1) We agree that it is not sound policy to lock up
important resources. We gain in wealth by using our natural
wealth and doubtless will continue to do so. There is good
reason, accordingly, to seek the development of effective and
economical processes for recovering oil from shale.
(2) Alternative fuel supplies are, however, wholly sufficient to permit orderly and equitable development of shale
oil resources. Extravagant, windfall or unknown rewards
need not be paid for hurried development. There need be no
irrational or helter skelter alienation of this public resource.
All who believe in conservation must resist such course.
(3) The interest of the people of the immediate area in
development is understandable. But the resource in question
belongs to all the people of the United States. Their interest
is paramount.
(4) In the early deliberations of the Board it was urged
that development was being held up by the unavailability of
public lands. On examination this contention fails to stand
up and little was heard of it in our later deliberations. Development is not, in fact, now being restricted or curtailed by
the fact that the larger part of the reserves are in public
hands. Oil companies that are as competent as any in the
country for development now own in fee simple shale resources far beyond any conceivable requirement for long
term development. They are being deterred not by government ownership of other land, not by fear of what the government may do with these lands, but because of the costs
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/2
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of development and because the further economics of production, as compared with alternative costs of crude oil, are
either unclear or unattractive. We conclude that the charge
that government ownership is holding up development is
based on either ignorance of the size and richness of present
private oil company holdings or an effort to turn local pressure for development into pressure on the Secretary of the
Interior to lease the lands.
(5) A case has been made, by some members of the
Board, for leasing public lands "in commercial size leases"
of otherwise unspecified size to oil companies, including those
that now are holding extensive private lands, on terms that
would encourage them to do research and development on
shale oil production. The leases would be conditional on
spending specified sums for such research and development
in the field of shale oil production. Any such course of action
must be rejected. It would be inconsistent with wise conservation practice and gravely damaging to the public interest.
Specifically:
-The cost of development is unknown.
-The

cost of production is unknown.

-The recoverable value of oil in the land offered for
lease is imperfectly known.
-Given these unknowns the government would be off ering a subsidy of unknown value for a development
of unknown cost promising a return of unknown
amount. This amounts to dispersing public property
while wearing multiple blindfolds. It would be justified, if at all, only by the absence of orderly procedures
or the need for greatest haste. Neither justification
exists.
-Genuine research effort is impossible to measure. The
company that put on a show of research cost and
effort and waited for a research breakthrough that
it could imitate might well profit equally with a firm
that did serious work.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967
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-While competition has virtue in many spheres, it is
not the normal recourse for research on major new
technologies. In the case of nuclear development, space
development, military development or, water desalinization, the established practice is to contract with one
or a small number of firms for a defined task.
-The foregoing view is supported, at least partially, by
the oil industry. One company, in its presentation to
the Oil Shale Advisory Board, noted that intelligent
leasing would first require further research and development work and that to issue leases contingent on
development would be impractical.
-Those supporting this proposal speak of Research and
Development leases-R & D leases-as though they
were a commonplace practice. In fact, the Department
of the Interior assures us that it has no precedent
for the grant of a lease to encourage "research and
development on uniderdeveloped industrial processes"
and that it has never issued such a lease.
-Leases seriously contingent on development would be
possible only for large firms with significant research
establishments. Smaller independents would be excluded.
-As noted, no one has defined a commercial size lease.
In the absence of such definition, and having in mind
the large quantities of oil underlying very small acreages, extremely large quantities of oil could be alienated
in the course of leasing seemingly very modest areas
of land. We do not assert that this is the purpose of
the "commercial-sized" lease, but plainly it could be
the result.
-The main body of the report rightly speaks of the
need for protecting landscape, preventing pollution
and conserving water. But what is required here will
depend on the recovery process employed. This will
vary greatly with the process employed. It will be
totally 'different for retort and in situ recovery. The
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/2
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proper conservation practices cannot be specified if
it is not known what practices will be required.
-The leasing of very small tracts for Research and
Devlopment is merely the use of a smaller amount
of public property as a subsidy to development. And
again what is "small" remains unspecified. (One onehundredth of the request of Shell or Sinclair would
still be a great deal of oil.) In informal conversation
it has been suggested that small lease might be not
more than forty acres. This would not involve serious
alienation of public resource. But it is difficult to say
that it would be any incentive especially to companies
which now own, in fee simple, many times this area.
We reluctantly conclude that the small R & D lease
came into the conversation only when the "commercialsize" lease could no longer be defended and on the
theory that to alienate a little public property for an
unknown result is better than to alienate a lot for
an unknown result.
-We conclude, accordingly, that the R & D leasing would
result only in transfer of lease rights to private owners
and there is no certainty or strong likelihood that it
would lead to development. It would thus be disappointing to local communities and the region. Their
interest, we believe, is in far more secure and certain
development procedures that are unclouded by the
'danger that land will be alienated, in accordance with
the primary present interest of producers, and not
developed.
(6) There is a businesslike, certain and straight-forward
course of action. It is for the Department of Interior, under
appropriate authorization, to enter into contracts with interested firms, tested by competence, to develop methods of
mining and processing or in situ recovery of shale oil. This
is the established procedure for work of this kind. It is safe,
orderly, economical and consistent with the public interest.
The resulting process or processes would then be available
on general license. This procedure will require public funds.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967
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But it is obviously unsupportable economic procedure to try
to save dollars by dissipating public property of unknown
but much greater value. This procedure will be no more
inimical to private enterprise than similar government re-

search and development contracts held by hundreds of private
companies including oil companies. Suggestions to the contrary are merely a smoke screen designed to exclude a prudent government policy for the development of this resource.
We note that the most ardent advocate of R & D leases is
favorable to all forms of government research and government
control except that which might be paid for with oil shale
lands. This is opposed.
(7) Once a process (or processes) is developed and proven
out rates of recovery and costs will be known. With modest
additional expenditure on drilling the government can establish the value of acreages which it chooses to lease. It can
also specify the conservation practices that are required. It
can also specify the rate of development, since there is known
process, which is necessary to keep the lease in good standing.
It can also relate the amount of leasing to need. And, since
process, costs of production and the value of the deposits
are known, it can negotiate or otherwise issue leases which
allow a fair return to the companies and insure an equitable
return to the people of the United States for their property.
(8) Under the foregoing procedures development will
go forward and without risk that leasing will be a cover not
for development but merely for the control of the land.
Under this system necessary public land would of course
be made available to the contracting firm. And it is consistent
with this proposal that necessary land be made available to
firms wishing to do research on their own account and for
this special purpose. This is especially justified if the firm
does not have land in the area. This is further discussed in
the associated concurring statement.
(9) Assuming that the R & D leases are serious undertakings, and not devices to gain control of the land, they still
exclude companies incapable of undertaking research on a
serious scale. The above procedure would allow of the parhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/2
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ticipation of any company able to finance the known recovery
process.
(10) Leasing may well be preferred by at least some of
the oil companies. This is natural. Even with grants of land
far smaller than those presently being requested, it promises
to provide a large and potentially valuable resource for a
modest cost. That leasing may convey large capital values
for a modest development outlay is not an argument in its
favor.
(11) The fact that competitive leasing may work well
for petroleum exploration is no argument whatever for its
use to encourage research and development. The two situations have nothing in common except the end product.
(12) We have been told that the Congress will not authorize appropriations for contracts for the development of oil
shale processes. Rather it will succumb to pressure from
some oil companies and aspiring lease holders to resist such
a course of action. This is an admission that the real interest
of those resisting such appropriation is the alienation of the
land not the development of the resource. Such obstruction
is obviously not a mandate for Executive action that plays
into the hands of those who obstruct.
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